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Griffiths, Marie, University of Salford, Information Systems Institute, Maxwell Building,
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Abstract
There is a growing body of research on resistance in IS projects, a good deal of which focuses on
strategies for overcoming resistance. However, within this strand of research, it appears that there is
a ‘blanket prescription’ approach that does not account for diversity in resistance reasoning. We
offer a qualitative study of the response of diverse actors to a pilot of a custom developed client
tracking information system, which brought about diverse covert and overt resistance activities. This
empirical research is used to explore the heterogeneous user and how such a ‘blanket prescription’ to
avert organisational-wide resistance went wrong and how resistance succeeded. This paper aims to
contribute to the body of existing literature on IS user resistance by emphasizing the injurious
continuous error of excluding such constructs as the heterogeneous user within user resistance
research.
Keywords: User Resistance, User Participation, Organisational Change, Strategic Management of
Systems Development.
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INTRODUCTION

The issue of user resistance is a key strategic consideration in IS projects. Indeed, there has been a
significant body of literature examining the complexities of user resistance in IS projects dating back
several decades (Keen 1981; Dickson and Simmons 1970). Attention has been given to the reasons for
resistance and strategies to resolve this phenomenon yet there is still no widespread conformity on
how to successfully tackle this continuing issue (Hirschheim and Newman 1988). Whilst emphasis has
been placed on investigating the link between user acceptance and user resistance (Davis 1989;
Venkatesh et al 2003; Delone and McLean 1992; Wong and Tate 1994), much of this work ignores (or
turns a blind eye) to the heterogeneous, situated nature of users (Lamb and Kling, 2003) and with that
the further nuance of system purpose (Jiang et al 2000). Additionally there is a lack of attention to the
potential tensions between different users affected by the development and implementation process
which if addressed would focus the lens somewhat upon the heterogeneous user (Markus 1983, and
Wong and Tate 1994). Yet, it seems reasonable to highlight that users reactions, intentions and
behaviour may differ if a system type is mandatory, voluntary, hedonic and based on user
characteristics such as level within any given organisational hierarchy (Marakus and Hornik 1996;
Barki and Huff 1985; van der Heijden 2004; Jiang et al 2000; Butler and Fitzgerald 1997). With this in
mind, our study is concerned with the idea that organisational actors involved in technological change
are not a homogeneous group but rather a group of users belonging to distinct groupings, each with
their own organisational agendas, personal agendas and societal worldviews. In this paper, against a
backdrop of user resistance in an IS context, we aim to explore this further by drawing upon a case
study of a pilot of a custom developed customer relationship management system. In doing this we
point to the need to consider the heterogeneous resistant user and how a blanket prescription based
strategy for overcoming resistance simultaneously proved problematic for change agents whilst it

became a conduit for successful resistance for various organisational actors. The paper opens by
briefly considering the nature of user resistance within an IS context. This exploration was edifying in
highlighting some problems and limitations of the resultant ‘blanket prescription’ strategies designed
for overcoming resistance, and these failings are further discussed. In the following section we present
an interpretation of the findings from a case study of the responses of diverse actors involved in an IS
pilot project which brought about diverse covert and overt resistance activities. Finally conclusions are
drawn which centre on providing insights into why a ‘blanket prescription’ strategy to avert
organisational-wide resistance went wrong and how user resistance succeeded. In sum, we argue this
is because the generic, prescriptive strategy for overcoming resistance deployed by the Managing
Director (MD) did not account for the diversity in resistance strategies employed by various
organisational actors.

2

USER RESISTANCE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Users of IS often respond in different ways to technological changes (Dickson and Simmons 1970),
ranging from total rejection, to a moderate rejection of some of its functionality (Markus 1983; Doolin
2004), demonstrated resistance (Hirschheim and Newman 1988), passive resistance (Marakas and
Hornik 1996), or reluctant begrudging acceptance (Brown et al 2002; Jiang et al 200). Resistance is
therefore a reaction or a symptom (Hirschheim and Newman 1988), an indicator of users attempting to
realign the change process, and if it is not considered it can undermine the system implementation
efforts and result in failure. In a general context, resistance can be understood as the intentional acts of
commission or omission that defy the wishes of others (Ashforth and Mael 1998; Newman 1989).
More specifically, in an organisational context, we can view resistance as the activities or intentions
through which those in organisations seek to oppose official and unofficial forms of control (Gabriel
2000, Newman 1989, Marakas and Hornik 1996). In an IS context, this might be exemplified as the
negative behaviour of system users that may prevent system designers achieving their objectives and,
ultimately, system implementation (Markus, 1983).
The study, and practice of, user resistance is diverse in nature, as we shall now explore further. Some
recognise that any resistant behaviour to IS which exhibits itself in overt manner (Marakas and Hornik
1996; Keen 1981; King and Anderson 1995; Newman 1989) is generally thought to be dysfunctional
(Newman 1989) motivated by crime or personal gain (Hirschheim and Newman 1988) oral
defamation, refusal to use the system (Martinko et al 1996) and involves active sabotage and
destruction of hardware (Martinko et al 1996). Marakas and Hornik (1996) further argue that users
may engage in destructive behaviour in an attempt to regain a control over their environment so that
they are not at the mercy of the new technology. Others recognise that resistant behaviour to IS can be
passive and covert (Lauer and Rajagopalan 2003; Marakas and Hornik 1996; King and Anderson
1995). Here, the passive resister may resentfully accept the system, customising working practices,
silently scheming to conspire in its downfall with a hidden agenda (Moyniham 2002). They may
exhibit acceptance like behaviour and use this to mask acts of resistance. These styles of resistance
are hard to detect (Newman 1989). Users may reluctantly accept (Brown et al 2002), divert and
challenge imposed systems and rules (Doolin 2004), and purposely use a system in a minimal fashion
(Martinko et al 1996). Thus, resistance can be overt and covert, active and passive.
The debate whether user resistance is either a positive or a negative construct is ongoing within the IS
community (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Wilson 1999; Grover et all, 1988). Some recognise the
concept of resistance as being functional, positive, and a legitimate behavioural response to
technological change (Hirschheim and Newton 1988), a rational response by a rational user to
dysfunctional or flawed technologies that require redesign or restructuring (Davis et al 1992; Martinko
et al 1996; Marakas et al 1996)). However is argued that it is also, most usually seen as a negative
dysfunctional activity that requires eradication or neutralising (Hirschheim and Newman’s 1989). As
King and Anderson (1995) state, resistance is wholly in the eye of the beholder. The beholder is

usually those trying to deal with resistance, rather than those who are performing it. Resistance is
typically seen as a problem of the resistors (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Grover et all, 1988;
Newman 1989) but Lyytinen’s (1988) empirical investigation into IS failures is studied from a
management viewpoint and Newman (1989) focuses the phenomenon through the IS practitioner
viewpoint. Jiang et al (1997) also highlight the importance of taking into account other stakeholders
perceptions in IS projects, arguing that ‘failures associated with IS development, users and IS
professionals do indeed have differing perceptions’ (Jiang et all 1997:936). Thus, depending upon the
perspective taken, resistance can be seen as functional and dysfunctional. Of course the reasons for
the occurrence of resistance are similarly lacking homogeneity, IS related change is argued to embody
a lack of familiarity, altering relationships, working patterns, and communication channels threatening
perceived status, power and authority (Keen 1981; Grover 1988; Markus and Pfeffer 1983). Also
resistance is often a response to the re-distribution of information, the breaking down of established
monopolies equating to the dissolution of existing power structures (Keen 1981; Markus 1983 Katz
and Kahn 1978), whilst, there is research that focuses upon reasons for resistance, the predominant
reason is the resistor’s pathological fear of change (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Selwyn 2003;
Hirschheim et all 1988).
Thus, there is a great deal of diversity in the way that resistance is conceptualised and enacted. Where
resistance is seen as an issue that needs to be dealt with, then there are various strategies to overcome
resistance are deployed. Jiang, Muhanna et al. (2000) report on a variety of strategies that researchers
have identified to overcome resistance, which they classify into two groupings: participative and
directive. Participative strategies are ‘user friendly’ and focus upon training, building support
structures, releasing adequate resources; architecting an optimistic environment. The directive
strategies are practical ‘business driven solutions’ and focus upon financial incentives for use of
system, user rights directives, role modifications, power redistribution, top management support, job
status modification, and job counselling but ultimately job elimination for those who do not want to
learn to use the new system. We have yet to find prescriptions and methods for encouraging
resistance! What is noticeable are the generic prescriptions and examples of non-specific guidelines
and/or generic solutions for indistinct users (Keen 1981; Markus 1981; Moyniham 2003) with blanket
strategies for predicting (Kettinger 2002), pre-empting (Martinko et al. 1996) and over-coming (Keen
1981) resistance. Yet, given so much diversity in the conceptualisation and enactment of resistance – it
is overt/covert, functional/dysfunctional, and acted out for a myriad of reasons, then it is surprising
that the strategies deployed are not as diverse. With this in mind, we now further investigate the
problems of deploying blanket strategies for overcoming diverse acts of resistance, through a case
study of a pilot IT project.

3

BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Our case is an expanding Management Consultancy small to medium enterprise ‘Jarman1’ that at the
time of this investigation was experiencing an accelerated growth, the company quadrupled in size,
expanding from two-sites to a six-site operation with a national UK coverage. ICT investment was
seen as a significant strategic issue - to support the expanding organisation. The IT project we discuss
here concerns the pilot of a custom, in-house developed application to support and monitor the
progress of a client through their process of mentoring and networking. This work is part of a wider
case study of user resistance within the same organisation (Craig-Smith, 1990; Walsham 1995). We
chose the single case approach as we agree with Darke et al’s (1998) view that single cases allow
researchers to investigate phenomena in depth in order to provide rich description and understanding.
For this part of the case study, multiple techniques of data collection were used, the most predominant
being participant and non-participant observation and formal and informal interviews. One of the
1

to pseudonym

researchers was based on site full-time as a researcher for two years as part of a Teaching Company
Scheme. Another researcher attended the organisation in support of the project at least one day per
week for the two years – we were highly engaged researchers (Nandhakumar and Jones, 1997). We
both observed and participated in the project from the requirement gathering stage and through to
implementation and attempted use. This enabled very rich insights - as each version of the pilot
scheme was presented reactions and responses were gathered. Once the pilot scheme became live, the
mandatory activity was monitored on a daily basis in addition the accumulating diverse resistance
strategies deployed. In addition historical documentation was made available together with unlimited
access to the new client tracking system documentation. A thorough contextualisation exercise was
enabled which lends this empirical data more depth as interrelationships and behavioural patterns
could be observed. What this investigation allowed us to witness was the termination of the pilot
scheme due to user resistance success. This study presents the opportunity to observe a multifarious
user group resisting technology induced change and also provide empirical evidence as related to the
utility of the blanket prescription so often put forward by those theories that conceptualise resistance
as pathological, problematic and unnecessary rather than symptomatic, educational and useful.
Attention has been exerted in developing the case data in more depth to ensure that readers may
achieve a genuine empathy with the organisational actors involved. The authors are aware that this
may result in allocation issues in other components of the research process to be perceived as ‘gently’
lacking for more description but in this instance the case data is highly relevant in justifying the
overall argument.
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CASE STUDY FINDINGS

Jarman is a management consultancy that works with senior executives to find them new roles when
they have been made redundant. It does this through processes of mentoring and networking
facilitated by a personal executive career consultant. This working relationship between consultants
and Jarman is very informal with clients being allocated on an as and when basis. It is a mutually
dependent relationship where the implicit and explicit connections blur because once the client
procedure starts and the initial basic contact and contract details have been recorded and centrally
stored, the continuing client information is stored by and kept externally with the consultant. The
rationale has always been that client information maybe of a sensitive nature so should be stored
securely but this procedure is becoming problematic as the company expands and the client base
grows. In order to manage the existing process, regular updates (were supposed to be) submitted by
the consultants (either by e-mail, written and sometimes verbally) to administrators for entry onto the
client system. The process is and always has been problematic because of the tension between Jarman
management needing progress data about clients and consultants not wanting to give too much
information away. It was felt that situation required investment, not a simple financial infusion but
time for changes to embedded ad hoc working practices. A decision was made, reluctantly but
perceptively by the Managing Director to further develop the existing IT support and in doing so
centralise and formalise the process. Once those changes had been established and accepted a second
stage was planned, to enable consultants to securely enter client details directly onto the system. An
enterprise wide package was being selected for implementation in a years’ time and thus, there was a
twelve month window to undertake preparatory incremental change. A pilot scheme was set up, newly
designed forms, training sessions, written guidelines and improved reporting functionality was added
to existing client system. The team conducting the pilot were available on a daily basis for all the
stakeholders involved in the client process and update the MD on a fortnightly basis. Our investigation
centres on examining how a diverse user group reacted to the pilot which involved altering a decade of
embedded working practices.

5

THE ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS

The users included a broad spectrum of staff from the administrative, through middle management and
to director level. Each had agendas, concerns and dilemmas when confronted with mandatory
involvement in the pilot project. Table 1 below details the organisational actors’ roles with respect to
the existing system and what was required of them throughout the pilot study and the hieratical status
that they hold. The timings of the pilot study were flexible because an objective was to alter embedded
behaviour and it was a mutually agreed that a rigid timeframe maybe too restrictive. However, the
pilot was not a new idea sprung upon the actors, there was documentary evidence that discussion and
meetings had taken place for over the last decade of how to capture client data. Senior Management
were aware that opposition and confrontation would be the universal response to the planned changes.
This was confirmed by the reaction of the actors involved in the requirement gathering stage and
reiterated when the Administrator reported that from the onset the pilot was being avoided. In response
the MD devised a naming and shaming strategy in an attempt to overcome resistance and ensure that
the pilot would be a success. The naming and shaming strategy worked as follows. Under the
direction of the MD, the Administrator was given a form by the project team which contained key
milestones in the provision of service provided to clients. These milestones were linked to particular
organisational actors. The administrator was instructed to report anyone who did not complete, or,
inform her that they had completed any given milestone, as it should be. On a weekly basis this
‘report’ was made into a list and given to the MD. He would then circulate that list throughout the
company, via e-mail, to all staff and external consultants thus naming and shaming people who were
perceived as resisters. The strategy continued for 4 weeks and it was discontinued at this point as
everyone had been named. The strategy had not worked as people were still resisting en-mass, the use
of the modified system. We will now explore further why the strategy failed and the resistors
succeeded by considering particular organisational actors responses to the naming and shaming
strategy. In ease case we begin by explaining their role as related to the system and consider what they
are resisting, why and how. We then highlight why the blanket strategy of naming and shaming didn’t
work.
Organisational Actors
Administrator
(supporting role to Sales
Director and
Consultants, no
managerial
responsibilities)

Management Director
(MD)
Reporting only to the
Chairman of the Board)
Consultants
Self Employed but
highly respected a
Managing Consultant
representing them on
the Board)
Sales Directors
(Reporting to a
Regional Director but
hold position on the
Board, also Head
specialist interest

Current role with the existing system
Role involved keeping database current,
often required to answer analytical
requests, maintain factually correct data
for monthly board reports.
They currently enter key data onto a
database from paper forms, e-mails,
verbal instructions and personally seeking
data directly from clients
Little input but as the founder was closely
involved with the current design so
demonstrated parochial issues

Role in the pilot study
Monitor the usage of pilot system,
report and collect instances of misuse.
The role was to police all activity,
naming individuals that did not conform
which meant reporting more senior
people to their superiors (Not a natural
role but some enjoyed the power)

Supplying data to administrator via a
paper based form which should be
completed with the client on the first
meeting (this then triggers the financial
process and an invoice should be sent to
the clients previous employer)

The pilot study was an attempt to
change working practices by
encouraging the release of client data,
the timely inputs of data and ultimately
exposure to new process of data entry
but firstly paper based

Their role is to conduct the introductory
client meeting and start the New Client
Form (NCF), which also includes the
client’s details and also importantly the
product which has been sold. This
ultimately determines the length of time,

Meet with the client and start the (NCF)
must include client program. This is
where they stop contact with the client
(there are many instances of NCFs not
being started so no –one is aware that
the client is requiring consultancy

If Administrator was police then the
MD was judge, jury and executor

groups)

which band of research activities, the
class of care

sessions

Table 1: Heterogeneous user group
5.1

The Administrator

Historically, the administrator was the member of staff who usually inputted new client data into the
existing database. The data came from a new client form that was completed by a consultant and
handed to her. With the implementation of the pilot, additional data also had to be input into the
system, and moreover, consultants were expected to input there own data wherever possible. The
administrator resisted the pilot for a number of reasons because she had to input extra data into the
system and her power base was being eroded. These were points of resistance because a) she had to
undertake additional work and b) because, prior to the pilot, she was the only person in the
organisation that had access to client data on the computer. The implication of the latter being, that
her role might eventually be made redundant or changed significantly, particularly as related to the
downgrading of her status. In terms of her resistance strategy, she vocalised, and exaggerated, the
instances of incorrect data entry by others, and continually highlighted the fact that other people could
cause big problems if they were allowed access to the system. Thus she created an atmosphere of
uncertainty surrounding the pilot. The blanket prescription of naming and shaming did not over come
her resistance activities because her role she wanted to put the data in so she was never going to be
shamed. Indeed, she compiled the naming and shaming list, and this actually supported part of her
strategy of resistance – to show that other people being involved would make the system fall down.
5.2

The Consultants

This group of actors were powerful members - being self-employed allowed them some protection
from company protocols. New clients were matched with consultants based on their skills and
expertise and they were paid monthly usually regardless of how often they met with the client,
payment ending once the client became recruited. The majority of client data related to, collected
during and required for the recruitment campaign was stored off-site with the consultants, they
submitted monthly reports about their clients to the Administrator and she inputted the data onto the
existing system, but this was on an ad-hoc basis, in different formats and any immediate client updates was usually only collected verbally. However, the pilot required all client-consultant recruitment
activities, CV, networking, speculative letters, and such details to be captured and that all client
meetings be logged centrally. The Consultants resisted the perceived monitoring, they did not want
their client-consultant activities scrutinised. Currently they were managing the recruitment campaign,
and they did not want to share their knowledge or expertise. They resisted the pilot because there
powerful positions were under threat and they were also required to contribute to this threat by
imputing the data themselves. Reasons for resistance were apprehension of a reduction in power and
perceived status, a dilution of their knowledge, the current private client relationship was to become
public and all meetings logged which may impact on their fees if the quota was not met. Moreover
many of them anticipated having to do what they saw as the non-paid ‘secretarial’ work of inputting
data into the ‘final’ enterprise system and this was not part of their role. There was also a real fear of
the new technology, the consultants were predominately near retirement age and some were IT literate.
Conspiring with each other, the Consultants became a imposing force, adding extra alarmed voices by
highlighting inadequacies and shortcomings of the pilot and the new procedures, by questioning the
confidentially and security risks of centralising highly sensitive private data. The Consultants tactic
was to ignore initial attempts to demand this information of them until they were directly asked or
coerced into to providing it (that is, potentially through loss of client contracts). However, the pilot
scheme dissolved before this stage was reached in earnest. A further tactic was avoidance and
distraction by creating a chaotic problematic situation when they seemed to be attempting to enter data

onto the system . This was helped enormously by the fact that Consultants had to share PCs with parttime staff members. Thus, they claimed they could not access the system when they needed to, and
that when they did, it didn’t work. They also began to demand formal training (which they new would
take time and resource to organise). In addition, increasingly, the Consultants arranged meetings away
from the office to further avoid confrontation regarding the pilot. The name and shame strategy failed
predominantly because, the consultants could not be shamed into entering the data, because they were
self employed (and in fact many also worked for one of Jarman’s competitors). Thus, the consultants
were empowered not to respond to this kind of coercion. Moreover, an added difficulty for the MD
was that most of the consultants were nearing retirement age anyway, and so would not have been so
worried had more extreme measures been taken, such as non-renewal of contracts. The consultants, in
short, would not be intimidated because of the balance of power relations between them and those at
Jarman.
5.3

The Sales Directors

The Sales Directors’ roles in the client tracking process was to conduct an introductory meeting with
the new clients and match them with a Consultant. This involved arranging a meeting at the company
premises where they would start a new client record. Basic contact data was collected alongside the
details of what service level the client purchased. This data collection was very informal, sometimes
completed on a paper and handed to the Administrator for inputting. Sometimes it was e-mailed but
in some cases the Administrator would be told to collect the required information on the second client
visit as the Sales people were to busy at the introductory meeting. This might mean the client services
team did not find out about a new client for some times leading to a delay in service provision. The
pilot was supposed to deal with this problem. However, The sales team were Directors so there was
an immediate resistance to the requests that formalised the structure of their work. Moreover, the
anticipated extra workload of populating the pilot with mandatory data was completely frowned upon
because of the additional work and the fact that many were not IT literate. A further issue was that the
directors did not want explicit details of the deals made between themselves and the client being
publicised via the system because although services were standardised variations in pricing and the
configuration of the service was done at the client level based on what the sales director thought it
would take to finalise the deal. This kind of knowledge was very much a source of power for this
group. Finally, the sales directors deemed themselves above data entry activity, seeing it as secretarial
work. Moreover, the were completely against the idea of being policed by a subordinate staff
member. The Administrator who was appointed the person to ‘police’ the pilot was placed in a
dubious position having to inform on her superiors to their superiors. The name and shame strategy
did not work with the sales directors primarily because they were senior members of staff who felt
they could legitimately resist. However, because these were senior staff their position was used to
avoid being named and shamed by resisting covertly as well as overtly. These staff made the
Administrator enter their data for them. Ironically, the Administrator was happy to do this as it
supported her, in her resistance strategy. Yet, even if she had not been happy to do this, it is likely she
would have done anyway – because they were her superiors.
5.4

Discussion

We have provided insights into the organisational actors’ motives and mechanisms for resisting and
also insights into why the name and shame strategy did not work. We show that there is diversity in
what these actors were resisting, why and how. This analysis goes someway to explaining why the
blanket strategy failed. In summary, the blanket prescription strategy did not allow for any
demarcation of the actors involved in resistance activities nor did it attempt to facilitate an
understanding of why these senior professionals, external Consultants and administration staff resisted.
The case of the administrator demonstrates how a strategy for overcoming resistance might actually be

consistent with, and even reinforce a certain individual, or groups resistance strategy. The more
people who were listed on the naming and shaming list, the better for the administrator as it supported
her view that the system should be left to her. The underlying assumption was that the existing system
worked, why change it? The case of the consultants shows how some groups may not respond to a
particular strategy because they are not intimidated by it. Underlying a lack of intimidation of course,
are a complex set of power relations which the name and shame strategy just did not take account of.
This was also the case with the sales directors. However, the case of the sales directors also illustrates
the fact that the name and shame strategy really was configured for overt resistance – the obvious
behaviours associated with NOT using the new system. It did not account for covert resistance where
the sales directors avoided being named and shamed by passing their work over to the Administrator.
Combined, the cases also show how, intended or otherwise, diverse acts of resistance might reinforce
each other. The sales directors passing their work to the administrator, the consultants’ protests
regarding the problems of the system and their demands for training all went some way to supporting
the Administrator in her efforts to keep existing practices. In the end, all of the strategies worked as
the pilot was withdrawn, temporarily at least.

6

CONCLUSION

Resistance is clearly a strategic consideration in any IS project and there is a pressing need to
understand the area further. There is need for a broader perspective of this multifaceted phenomenon
and a continuing insistence from academia that a better understanding of resistance will lead to
enhanced, informed strategies for working with it (Markus 1983; Lauer and Rajagopalan 2003). Prior
work recognised diversity in the conceptualisation and enactment of resistance, yet it appears that
strategies for ‘dealing with’ resistance as prescribed in the literature, and deployed in practice (as our
case shows) seem to lack sufficient attention to this. We have therefore investigated this matter
further and have offered insights into the failure of a blanket strategy deployed to overcome diverse
resistance strategies. The result being the ‘failure’ of a pilot project and claims of success for the
resistors. How long lived this will be remains to be seen, the company in question is in the process of
deploying the enterprise system. The purpose of this paper is descriptive rather than prescriptive
which why there are no specific guidelines or recommendations emerging from the case study
findings. However, in sum, it is clear that when attempting to answer the why and how questions of IS
resistance, attention should be given to the heterogeneity of user groups and their responses to
different aspects of IS development, which will only contribute to a richer understanding of the
phenomenon.

7

REFERENCES

Al-Gahtani, S. S. and M. King (1999). "Attitudes, satisfaction and usage: factors contributing to each
in the acceptance of Information Technology." Behaviour & Information Technology 18(4): 277297.
Amoako-Gyampah, K. (2004). "ERP implementation factors: A comparison of managerial and enduser perspectives." Business Process Management Journal 10(2): 171-183.
Ashforth, B. E. and Mael. F. A. (1998). The Power of Resistance: Sustaining Valued Identities. Power
and Influence in Organizations. R. M. Kramer and M. A. Neale. London, Sage: 89-120.
Barki, H. and Huff. S, (1985). "Change, Attitude to Change and Decision Support System Success."
Information & Management 9: 261-268.
Brown, S. A., A. P. Massey, et al. (2002). "Do I really have to? User acceptance of mandated
technology." European Journal of Information Systems 11: 283-295.

Butler, T, and Fitzgerald, B. (1997) "A Case Study of User Participation in the Information Systems
Development Process." Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Information System,
Atlanta, Georgia, USA: 411-426
Craig-Smith, N. (1990). "The case study: a useful research method for information management."
Journal of Information Technology 5: 123-133
Darke, P. Shanks, G., and Broadbent, M. (1998). " Successfully completing case study research:
combining rigour, relevance and pragmatism" Information Systems Journal, 8(4): 273-289
Davis, F.D (1989). "Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use and user acceptance of information
technology." MIS Quarterly 13(3): 319-340
DeLone and McLean. (1992) "Information systems success: the quest for the dependent variable
Information system research." 3(1): 60-95.
Dickson, G. and Simmons, J. (1970). "The Behavioural side of MIS: Some Aspects of the People
Problem." Business Horizons. August: 59-71.
Doolin B. (2004). "Power and resistance in the implementation of a medical management information
system." Information Systems Journal 14: 343-362.
Friedman, A. L. and Cornford, D. S. (1989). Computer Systems Development: History, Organization
and Implementation. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester.
Gabriel, Y., Fineman, S. and Sims, D. (2000). Organizing and Organizations, 2nd ed. Sage
Publications, London.
Grover, V., Lederer, A, and Sabherwal, R. (1988). "Recognizing the Politics of MIS." Information and
Management 14(3): 145-156.
Howcroft, D. and M. Wilson (2003). "Paradoxes of participatory practices: the Janus role of the
system developer." Information and Organisation 13: 1-24.
Hirschheim, R. and Newman M. (1988). "Information Systems and User Resistance: Theory and
Practice." The Computer Journal 31(5): 398-407.
Jiang, J., Klein, G., Balloun. J. and Crampton, S., (1998). "Systems analysis' orientations and
perceptions of system failure." Information and Software Technology 41: 101-106.
Jiang, J., W. Muhanna, et al. (2000). "User resistance and strategies for promoting acceptance across
system types." Information & Management 37: 25-36.
Katz, D. and R. L. Kahn (1978). The social psychology of organisations. New York, John Wiley.
Keen, P.G.W. (1981). "Information Systems and Organizational Change." Social Impacts of
Computing 24(1): 24-33.
Kettinger, W. J. and C. L. Choong (2002). "Understanding the IS-User Divide in IT Innovation."
Communication of the ACM 45(2): 79-84.
King, N. and Anderson, N (1995). "Innovation and Change in Organizations." Routledge, London.
Kling, R. (1980). "Social Analyses of Computing: Theoretical Perspectives in Recent Empirical
Research." Computer Surveys 12(1): 61- 110.
Kujala, S. (2003). "User involvement: a review of the benefits and challenges." Behaviour &
Information Technology 22(1): 1-16.
Lamb, R. and R. Kling (2003). "Reconceptualizing Users as Social Actors in Information Systems
Research." MIS Quarterly 27(2): 197-235.
Lauer and Rajagopalan (2003)" Conceptualization of User Acceptance and Resistance in System
Implementation Research: A Re-examination of Constructs." Working paper
Lyytinen,K. (1988). "Expectation Failure Concept and Systems Analysts' View of Information System
Failures: Results of an Exploratory Study." Information & Management 14: 45-56
Marakas, G. M. and S. Hornik (1996). "Passive resistance misuse: overt support and convert
recalcitrance in IS implementation." European Journal of Information Systems 5: 208-219.
Markus, L. (1983). "Power, Politics, and MIS Implementation". Communication of the ACM
26(6):430-444.
Markus, M.L.. and Pfeffer, J. (1983) "Power and the Design and Implementation of Accounting and
Control Systems." Accounting, Organization and Society. 8, (2-3): 205-218.

Martinko, M., J. Henry, et al. (1996). "An attributional explanation of individual resistance to the
introduction of information technologies in the workplace." Behaviour & Information Technology
15(5): 313-350.
Nandhakumar, J. and Jones, M. (1997), "Too Close for Comfort? Distance and Engagement in
Interpretive Information Systems Research", Information Systems Journal, 7(2): 109-131.
Newman, M. (1989) "Some Fallacies in Information Systems Development" International Journal of
information Management, 9: 127-143.
Selwyn, N. (2003). "Apart from technology: understanding people's non-use of information and
communication technologies in everyday life." Technology in Society 25: 99-116.
Van der Heijden, (2004). "User Acceptance OF Hedonic Information Systems" MIS Quarterly 27(3):
695-705.
Venkatesh, V., M. Morris, et al. (2003). "User Acceptance of Information Technology: towards a
Unified View." MIS Quarterly 27(3): 425-478.
Walsham, G. (1995). "Interpretive Case Studies in IS Research: Nature and Method." European
Journal of Information Systems 4(2): 74-81.
Wong, E. and Tate, G. (1994) "A study of user participation in information systems development".
Journal of Information Technology, 9, 51-60.

